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Modern Legal Times:
Making a Professional Legal Culture
Michael Ariens
Introduction
In the legal profession we like certain
beginnings, and it is almost too easy to date the
beginning of the modern legal profession from 1870.
Hubbell's Legal Directory was only one year old.
The first written bar examinations were introduced
in 1870. The Albany Law Journal was first
published on January 8, 1870. That same month,
Charles Eliot, the new President of Harvard
University, appointed an 1854 graduate of the law
school named Christopher Columbus Langdell to
the faculty. On February 1, the first meeting of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York
was held. In the summer of 1870, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., was named co-editor of the American
Law Review, and began his systematic study of
jurisprudence resulting ten years later in the
publication of The Common Law. In the fall,
Langdell was named to the newly created post of
Dean at the Harvard Law School. When Langdell
began his Fall 1870 contracts class by asking, "Mr.
Fox, please state the facts in Bryan v. Cave," the
modern legal profession was underway.'
This essay is a truncated history of the making
of the American legal profession. In contrast to other
efforts, the focus of this paper is on the creation
and development of legal institutions which
fostered the belief, by lawyers, in their profession-
alism. Legal institutions include not only law
schools, bar associations and organizations like the
American Law Institute but also the system of legal
directories, the regional case reporter system
developed by the West Publishing Company and
continuing legal education groups. These institu-
tions, which contributed greatly to the making of
a distinctly professional culture in law in America,
are closely related to the formation of the system
of legal education first developed at Harvard Law
School in 1870. While a number of institutions were
created for instrumental reasons having nothing to
do with legal education (like Hubbell's Legal
Directory and the regional reporter system), these
institutions prospered in part because of their
ideological fit with the professionalizing ethos
embodied in Langdell's statement that "law is a
science."
Legal institutions, then, must be evaluated
through the ideological lens which encouraged and
fostered the notion that lawyers were part of a
scientific enterprise. The perception that law was
a science, and lawyers scientists, altered the shape
of the legal profession; this shape was further altered
by the development of legal institutions which
assumed the science of law, which thus greatly
changed the relationship of the legal profession to
American society. My intention is to examine several
legal institutions which assisted in the transforma-
tion of lawyers into such a powerful profession.
However, I am not asserting that the making of
the modern legal profession is simply the result of
the creation of law schools based on the Harvard
model. My goal is to recognize the expanding sphere
of influence the American system of legal education
had on the American bar.
This essay will first trace the development of
legal education beginning in 1870, for the creation
and entrenchment of a university—and post-
baccalaureate—based legal education was the
catalyst for many of the developments which
followed. I will then examine the creation and
development of selected legal institutions in modern
legal times in light of the history of legal education
and their impact on the legal profession. This essay
will make much of the fact that disparate but related
events occurred at approximately the same time.
I make this point for two reasons: it satisfies a need
lawyers have for order and making sense of things,
and it enables me to tell a better story.
Modern Legal Education'^
The modern law school is based on the
nineteenth century notion that law is a science. On
two occasions, in 1871 in his Preface to the first
American casebook. Cases on Contracts, and in 1886
on the Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary
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of the founding of Harvard University, Langdell
discussed the idea of law as a science:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles
or doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to
apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-
tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer;
and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of
every earnest student of law.. . . But the cases which are useful
and necessary for this purpose at the present day bear an
exceedingly small proportion to all that have been reported.
The vast majority are useless, and worse than useless, for any
purpose of systematic study. Moreover the number of
fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly
supposed; the many different guises in which the same doctrine
is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to
which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the
cause of much misapprehension. If these doctrines could be so
classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper
place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from
their number.
[It] was indispensable to establish at least two things, first
that the law is a science; secondly, that all available materials
of that science are contained in printed books. If law be not
a science, a university will best consult its own dignity in
declining to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of
handicraft, and many best be learned by serving an
apprenticeship to one who practices it. If it be a science, it will
scarcely be disputed that it is one of the greatest and most difficult
of sciences, and that it needs all the light that the most
enlightened seat of learning can throw upon it. Again, law can
be learned and taught in a university by means of printed
books.... [I]f printed books are the ultimate sources of all legal
knowledge; if every student who would obtain any mastery of
law as a science must resort to these ultimate sources; and if
the only assistance which it is possible for the learner to receive
is such as can be afforded by teachers who have travelled the
same road before him,—then a university, and a university alone,
can furnish every possible facility for teaching and learning
law We have also constantly inculcated the idea that the
library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike;
that it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are
to the chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural
history is to the zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to
the botanists.'
Langdell's conviction that law was a [natural]
science justified a number of radical changes in
approaches to law: first, law was best learned in
school, not as an apprentice to a practicing lawyer;
second, law consisted of a relatively small number
of legal principles, and the mass of material
incorporated in treatises written and used by lawyers
was useless; third, only an expert (i.e., professor)
dedicated to the study of law, could effectively
master and impart those difficult principles of law;
fourth, since the law was based on a small number
of legal principles, the implicit assumption was that
the law should be uniform throughout the United
States, and law schools were to teach a form of
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"nationalized" law which transcended any
particular state law rules; and fifth, the scientific
approach was based on analyzing the "right" cases
in search of the basic principles of law, cases selected
by the professor to form a casebook; an attempt
by the professor and the class to analyze these cases
took the place of lectures by the professor.
Langdell's vision appeared both an intellectual
advance compared with either the apprenticeship
system or the pedagogical system of lectures, and
cost-effective. By analogizing law to science,
Langdell encouraged the belief that prospective
lawyers needed expert and systematic training,
training largely not available in an apprenticeship.
Langdell also believed that a proper "Socratic"
interchange between the teacher and one student
concerning a case would better teach legal principles
not only to that student but also to the rest of the
class. That is, there was no need for a student to
participate in the exchange in order to grasp the
scientific principles adduced during the exchange.
Therefore, a large class of students could learn as
effectively as a small class of students. A student-
teacher ratio of 75:1 permitted the university (and
law school entrepreneurs) to view a law school as
profitable, and from 1870-1890 the number of law
schools doubled. In the succeeding twenty years the
number again doubled.
Langdell's unifying perspective also created a
new addition to the legal profession: the legal
mandarin. In 1873, Langdell convinced the Harvard
Board of Overseers to approve a five year contract
for James Barr Ames to teach at the law school.
Ames had graduated from Harvard in 1872 and
obviously had little practical experience at the bar.
However, Ames had been one of Langdell's first
acolytes and had excelled as a student at Harvard.
If law was a science, Ames's lack of experience was
not a hindrance to his teaching ability, for the
principles of law were found in the library not in
the practice of law. Instead, the daily practice of
law often caused the practitioner to lose sight of
the scientific principles undergirding law, which
would make a practitioner less suitable as a law
teacher. While Harvard continued to hire retired
judges and practicing attorneys to teach, the hiring
of the inexperienced but academically successful
Ames signalled another development created as a
consequence of Langdell's theory, a development
which dominates the present legal academic world.
At the same time, events in the legal profession made
law schools a much more attractive place to educate
future lawyers than apprenticeships.
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First, law schools appeared to better assist
prospective lawyers in entering the legal profession.
Beginning in 1871, the state of New York limited
entry into the profession to those who both passed
a public examination and completed either three
years of apprenticeship in a lawyer's office or one
year of law school. In addition, Albany and
Columbia law school graduates were statutorily
granted a diploma privilege, which exempted them
from the public examination requirement because
they had received law degrees. Some prospective
lawyers attended law schools rather than appren-
ticing in law offices because they perceived the legal
science taught in law school as better preparation
for a public (and, beginning in 1877, a written)
examination. The diploma privilege available in
New York and other jurisdictions also encouraged
prospective lawyers to attend law school. Finally,
the New York statute permitted applicants educated
for one year at law school to take the bar
examination while requiring a three-year clerkship
for those not attending law school, which indicated
another bias favoring law schools over
apprenticeships.
Second, in August 1878, the American Bar
Association (ABA) was founded in Saratoga
Springs, New York.^  The progenitor of the
Association was a Connecticut lawyer and Yale Law
School graduate, Simeon Baldwin. Baldwin's
interest in a national bar association was intimately
related to his conviction that learning law was best
accomplished in a graduate legal education. Among
the purposes listed by the founders of the ABA in
Article I of its constitution were advancing "the
science of jurisprudence" and upholding the honor
of the legal profession. This latter provision meant,
according to Professor Matzko, "raising standards
of legal education and admission to the bar." The
next year the ABA founded a standing committee
on legal education to effectuate that goal.
Supporting legal education and disparaging legal
apprenticeships was a prominent goal of the ABA,
and this goal was based in part on fostering the
science of jurisprudence. The year before the ABA
organized, the New York State Bar Association was
founded. One of its stated purposes was to "cultivate
the science of jurisprudence."* This unity of
purpose among Langdell and bar organizers like
Baldwin may have covered disagreements about the
utility of the case method in understanding the
science of jurisprudence but the broader goal of
viewing law as a science subsumed those narrower
pedagogical differences. While the ABA never
accounted for more than a tiny percentage of lawyers
during the nineteenth or early twentieth century.
27
its membership consisted of the "elite" members
of the bar and its influence far outstripped its size.
Third, by 1886, when Langdell spoke at the
250th anniversary of Harvard's founding, the
university-based, scientific approach to legal
education begun at Harvard Law School was clearly
a success. While the Harvard Law School had seen
its enrollment drop to a very low level in the 1882-
83 academic year, by 1886 the law school had seen
its enrollment surge and had achieved some degree
of financial support from alumni. That same year,
elite New York City practitioners and pre-1870
Harvard Law School graduates James Coolidge
Carter and Joseph H. Choate signed a circular
pledging financial support for the law school, and
Louis D. Brandeis organized, as Secretary, the
Harvard Law School Association, an alumni fund-
raising organization dedicated to the financial
support of the law school. This financial support
from influential practitioners in Boston and New
York secured Langdell's approach from any attack
by other disenchanted alumni. Financial support
also could be used to convince prospective students
that law school generally, and the case method in
particular, were viewed favorably by successful
practitioners.
Fourth, technological changes, including the
telephone and the typewriter, made the apprent-
iceship system less important to the profession.^
Finally, the exponential increase in the 1870s and
1880s of published case reports necessitated the
creation of a group of experts capable of organizing
and critiquing this explosion of law.
By the turn of the century, legal education had
triumphed over the apprenticeship system. More
specifically, the case method of instruction had
triumphed over the lecture method. While
requirements concerning the amount of pre-legal
education necessary to enter law school and the
period of study necessary in law school were debated
through the 1920s, the law school had become the
center for learning law. One example of the maturity
of law schools was the creation in 1900 of the
Association of American Law Schools. The AALS
was created by the "better" law schools to
differentiate themselves from the mass of law
schools. It additionally cemented the differences
between the practitioner and the legal academic.
The American law school has changed little
since its initial triumph by 1900. While there is
a greater variety of courses, teaching methods and
approaches to law offered in today's law schools,
the structure of the law school remains remarkably
the same. Law school is a three-year program, the
first year of which largely consists of private law
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courses taught to large classes through the primary
text of a casebook by an academic whose experience
in the practice of law is limited. Approximately
ninety percent of all ABA-accredited law schools
are affiliated with universities which are members
of the AALS and require applicants to possess a
college degree before matriculating (the rest require
at least three years of college work). Most of the
students' work after the first year will consist of
more case-oriented courses and library-based
research. Clinical offerings are spotty and often not
considered part of the "main" curriculum.
American legal thought since Langdell also has
largely adopted (and adapted) the view that law is
a science. The founder of sociological jurispru-
dence, Roscoe Pound, later Dean at Harvard Law
School, believed that while law was an instrument
to obtain justice and not an autonomous realm,
it remained a science. The American legal realists
of the 1930s, who deprecated Langdell's formalism
and Pound's sociological jurisprudence, also
believed that law was a science; in their view,
however, law was a social science rather than a
natural science. The post-World War II jurispru-
dential theories of reasoned elaboration and law and
economics concluded that law was a rational
science. It has only been in the past fifteen years
that law has been viewed as non-scientific.
Turning lawyers into a professional class
required more than the incantation that "law is
a science." One requirement was to progressively
tighten admission standards for the practice of law.
Law schools contributed to the making of the
profession first, by displacing the apprenticeship
system and second, by regulating themselves and
the students they admitted and graduated. While
the first goal was achieved by 1900, the second goal
required the creation of several institutions.
The most important institution created by law
schools which markedly affected the making of a
legal profession was the Law School Admission
Test. The 1920s were a tumultuous time for legal
education and the legal profession, and one
"professionalizing" method was the creation, at
Columbia Law School, of a legal aptitude test which
followed closely in time the development of general
aptitude tests. The test, given from 1921-24, tested
abstract reasoning and the ability to deal with
symbols and was given "to avoid the human waste
of allowing men without requisite capacity to
embark upon studies at which they were doomed
to fail."' The Columbia test was followed by the
Ferson-Stoddard Law Aptitude Examination in
1925, which was adopted by nine schools. Yale Law
School instituted an aptitude test in 1931. Other
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schools, including the Universities of California,
Michigan and Iowa, began using aptitude tests
before the end of World War II.
The idea of creating an organization to
implement uniform admission standards was first
brought to the attention of the AALS in 1938. It
was only after the end of World War II, however,
that a Conference on the Legal Aptitude Test met
and the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) was
implemented. Columbia's Legal Aptitude Test (the
Lorge examination) successfully distinguished the
poor student from rest of the applicants but was
considered unsatisfactory because it did not
distinguish between the "good" applicant and the
"excellent" applicant. In 1947 Columbia convinced
Harvard and Yale to join it in financially
supporting an examination drafted by the College
Entrance Examining Board. The first Law School
Admission Test was given experimentally to first
year law students at seven law schools in 1947. In
1948, the LSAT was given to students in time for
use in admitting students for the 1948-49 academic
year. Within ten years the number of LSAT
examinations administered exceeded the number of
first year law students enrolled in law schools, and
the LSAT eventually became one of the two
"objective" criteria by which students were selected
for admission at all law schools.
An examination which permitted Columbia to
distinguish between the good and the excellent
candidate allowed Columbia and other schools to
better market their students to law firms in New
York and elsewhere, thus to attract more "qualified"
students and to attract more law firms and (maybe)
more funds for the school from alumni grateful that
their diploma was increasing in "value." This cycle
of success prodded other law schools to compete
with Columbia by being more selective in admitting
students. This, combined in the 1960s and 1970s
with a tremendous increase of persons interested
in becoming lawyers, led to higher entry barriers
into law school and into the legal profession.
By making the LSAT a prerequisite to
admission to any law school, entry into law was
further "professionalized" to the extent that it
appeared that law school admissions were merit-
based. Entry into the profession was regulated by
the nearly universalized requirement that students
be graduates of a law school, and law school
admission was regulated by admitting only those
who performed well on this "objective" test. One
way in which the LSAT was deemed merit-based
was by relying on empirical studies which have
shown that there is some correlation between LSAT
score and first-year grades. By assuming the
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relevance of first-year grades to the making of a
competent lawyer, the LSAT is made objective. Of
course, there is no empirical study showing that
the competency of a lawyer is based on their first-
year grades. It is simply assumed that law school
teaches students in the science of jurisprudence, and
it is particularly assumed that the Langdellian-
based first year of law school teaches the science
of law. The acceptance of the LSAT, then, by law
schools as well as by law firms is an acceptance
of the system of legal education based on Langdell's
ideas. There is no evidence (and I doubt there could
be any such proof) correlating LSAT scores with
lawyerly competence or ability.
The stature of the legal profession was
enhanced as entry requirements into law schools
were raised. In the last fifty years, since lawyers
attend law school (almost always) only after
graduation from college, the seven years of
education after high school could be used to justify
the power and income (and maybe prestige) of
lawyers. Beginning after World War II, law schools
admitted only those students who deserved
admission based on the objective criteria of their
undergraduate grade point average and LSAT score,
which reinforced notions of selectivity in entry into
the legal profession.
Making lawyers professionals required the
development of a number of other institutions,
many of which were related to Langdell's belief that
law was a science. In the next section I will discuss
a few of those institutions which have helped create
present perceptions of the American legal
profession.
Modern Legal Institutions
Uniformity and Legal Institutions
Cultivating the science of jurisprudence and
enhancing the status of its members also led the
ABA to include in its initial list of purposes the
goal of uniformity in law. By asserting that there
existed only a few principles of law and by
compiling a list of (mostly English) cases from
which to derive those principles, the legal science
of Langdell implicitly assumed that there should
be a uniformity of law. One of the most persistent
ideas in modern American law is that uniformity
of law in the United States is both desirable and
capable of accomplishment.
In 1881, the Alabama State Bar proposed to
the ABA and other state bar associations that they
support efforts to create uniformity in law
throughout the states. No action was taken until
1889, when the ABA created a Committee on
Uniform State Laws, consisting of one member from
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each state. The next year the New York state
legislature passed an act authorizing the governor
to appoint three commissioners whose duty it was
to study uniformity. The ABA immediately passed
a resolution calling for all states to pass an act
similar to the New York Act. In 1892, commissioners
from eight states attended the first meeting of the
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, held at the
same time as the annual ABA meeting.
The first effort of the organization, which
altered its name in 1896 to the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was a
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, adopted by
the Conference that same year. According to
Harvard Law School historian (and professor)
Arthur Sutherland, Harvard Law School Dean
James Barr Ames, author of Cases on Bills and
Notes, was unaware of the existence of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law until four states had
already passed the law. Ames, who had succeeded
Langdell as Dean at Harvard in 1895, criticized the
uniform law in an article published in the Harvard
Law Review in 1900. By this time, the uniform law
had been enacted by fifteen states and Congress.
Ames's criticism was that the technical drafting
defects of the law required its abolition. This article
sparked a law review debate between Ames and the
President of the Conference.
While Ames lost the battle (the Negotiable
Instruments Law was eventually enacted by every
state), he, on behalf of legal academics, won the
war. Ames was appointed a Commissioner on
Uniform Laws by the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts in 1902, and the Conference shortly
thereafter appointed Harvard Law School Professor
Samuel Williston to draft the Uniform Sales Act,
adopted by the Conference in 1906. By 1910,
Williston had further authored or co-authored for
the Conference the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act. Williston was the first
of a long line of academics, largely academics at
"elite" law schools, who have been asked to lend
their expertise to uniform or model legislation.
Two patterns emerged from this delegation of
authority by practitioners to academics: First, the
Acts required interpretation, which academics
offered by writing treatises and other interpretive
guides for use by practitioners. Williston followed
his work on the Uniform Sales Act with a 1909
treatise on the law of sales, in large part a
commentary on the Uniform Sales Act. Williston
later followed his work as Reporter for the
Restatement of Contracts with a multi-volumed new
edition of his treatise on contracts. Second, it
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confirmed two views: one, that uniformity in law
was possible and two, that legal academics, as the
scientists of the legal profession, were in a better
position than practitioners to guide efforts to make
uniform law.
The profession's efforts to make law more
uniform was a consequence of the gradual
acceptance, within and without the law school, that
law was a science. It was also a response to the
realization that decisions by courts in the different
states were not uniform, a realization caused by the
publication by West Publishing Company of all
the cases decided by the highest court of each of
the states. These efforts eventually led to the
formation of the American Law Institute in 1923.
In 1914, when the Association of American Law
Schools and the American Bar Association first held
their annual meetings separately, the president of
the AALS suggested the creation of a juristic center.
It was not until 1920, after the end of World War
I, that the idea was revived. The proposal to revive
a juristic center was analogized to the Common-
wealth Fund which that same year had organized
a Legal Research Committee to aid legal reform.
The nature and scope of the center was altered in
the intervening years, and in February 1923, the
first meeting of the American Law Institute (ALI)
was held in Washington, DC before an unprece-
dented gathering of the nation's legal elite,
including Elihu Root, the first President of the ALI,
and William Draper Lewis, the first Executive
Secretary of the ALI.
Shortly before the formation of the ALI, Root
and Lewis had suggested to the bar a uniformity
of another sort: uniformity in legal education. The
AALS and the ABA had both attempted to induce
some stringent regulation of law schools from 1900.
In 1910, the Carnegie Foundation published the
Flexner Report which examined the education
offered by all medical schools. The medical
profession used the Flexner Report to influence
states to close some medical schools, raise admission
standards and the quality of medical schools and
to enhance their professional status. In the forty
years since Langdell had become Dean at Harvard,
the number of law schools had quadrupled to 124.
In 1913, the ABA's Section on Legal Education
invited the Carnegie Foundation to undertake a
similar study of law schools. Alfred Z. Reed, a
nonlawyer, was assigned to the study. While Reed
was visiting law schools and readying his report,
professors whose schools belonged to the AALS
packed the 1920 meeting of the Section on Legal
Education of the ABA and caused the appointment
of a Committee on Legal Education. This
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committee, chaired by Elihu Root, prepared a report
adopted the next year which declared that (1) law
school was the only place to obtain an adequate
legal education, (2) two years of university studies
were a necessary prerequisite to law school
admission and (3) the diploma privilege was
formally disapproved.
A month after Root's report was published.
Reed's study. Training for the Public Profession
of the Law, suggested that uniform standards for
law schools would not benefit either the profession
or the public(s) the profession served. Reed noted
that the legal profession was presently a diverse
profession; since American society was growing
more pluralistic, this diversity in the profession was
to be encouraged, not suppressed. Consequently,
the training of lawyers by different kinds of law
schools with different goals and missions was
beneficial to society.
Neither the ABA nor the AALS approved of
Reed's study and both took steps to create
uniformity in the legal profession. Beginning in
1923, in the same year as the founding of the ALI,
the ABA began accrediting law schools based on
uniform standards to be applied to all law schools.
While at first this had little coercive impact on law
schools, the ABA began encouraging states to limit
the bar examination to persons who were graduates
of ABA-accredited law schools. In 1935, only nine
states required an examinee to have graduated from
an ABA-accredited law school while in 1984, forty-
eight states had such a requirement.' The AALS
also progressively toughened its accreditation
standards while encouraging schools to join the
association. The AALS, through individual
professors at several of its most prominent
institutions, also assisted in creating uniformity
through the ALI's Restatement project.
The purpose of the ALI was to clarify and
simplify the common law via a restatement of the
law. When completed in 1944, the project to restate
the law encompassed the restatement of the law of
Agency (1923-33), Conflicts of Law (1923-34),
Contracts (1923-32), Restitution (1923-37), Torts
(1923-39), Property (1927-44), Trusts (1927-35),
Security (1936-41) and Judgments (1940-42); it is
undoubtedly the most successful effort to alter law
in American legal history. The certainty by which
most of the restatements declared the correct law,
their impeccable establishment credentials and the
timing of the publication of the restatements made
them an instant success.
The cases published by West evidenced an
inescapable problem which the restatements were
to resolve: in a federal system in which opposing
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or inconsistent legal rules existed side by side, how
did lawyers or judges capable of choosing between
these inconsistent rules justify one as correct and
the other as incorrect? The Restatement of the Law
was designed to provide an answer to which those
perplexed lawyers and judges could turn. The
restatements drafted and approved by the ALI
consisted literally of black-letter rules followed by
illustrative commentary and examples. The black-
letter rule enunciated by the restatement was
intended to give lawmakers a confidence that their
decisions would be correct. Additionally, society
could be confident of the correctness of the restated
position because of preeminence of the drafters of
the restatements. The committee assigned to prepare
a particular restatement consisted of prominent
practitioners, judges and an occasional professor.
The Reporter for the committee, the person who
ordinarily drafted the restatement, was almost
always a law professor, the expert in the field. After
the Reporter prepared a draft of the restatement,
it would be debated by the committee and the ALI
Council and only after a lengthy, time consuming
process would the draft be approved. This
bureaucratic structure, giving experts the power to
decide the "law," served as a purportedly neutral,
objective basis for courts to adopt the restatement
rule and to reject any contrary legal rule.
The belief in the neutrality and objectivity of
the restatements was important because of the
timing of their publication. The restatements were
published between 1932 and 1944, with the bulk
published in the 1930s. This timing was propitious
for two reasons: First, the restatements were
themselves a response to the charge that legal rules
had no intrinsic meaning, a charge made by a
number of legal academics who were grouped
together as legal realists. This charge, in its most
serious vein, was that the rule of law was a myth;
judges decided cases in a subjective politicized
manner, not as objective law (or rule) abiding
magistrates. This realist attack eliminated any
possibility of certainty in the law. Second, the Great
Depression and the growing interest in socialistic
and regulatory solutions to end the depression
threatened the largely conservative order in which
the legal profession had a great stake; the
restatements of the law were conservative legal
responses to societal changes because they assumed
the dominance of judge-made common law.
The acceptance by the profession of the
restatements was immediate. The individual
restatements were cited in support of appellate court
decisions thousands of times after their adoption.
The ALI eventually compiled a work which noted
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the citations in cases to provisions of the
restatements.
As the work wound down in the late 1930s and
early 1940s, the ALI began working on model codes.
Here, its success was much more limited: for
example, the Model Code of Evidence, proposed
in 1942, was not adopted by any state. The ALI
had more success when it worked with the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Their joint effort to fashion a Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) resulted in the adoption
of the UCC in all states except Louisiana.
The success of the Restatement of the Law,
however, lasted only for a short time. In 1953, a
mere nine years after the adoption of the last
restatement, the ALI began working on a Second
Restatement of the Law. Since "United States judges
no longer believe that stare decisis demands
slavishly following earlier decisions," it was
necessary to again restate the law in order to ensure
the relevance of the restatements.' The result was
a Restatement (Second) and, currently, the
beginnings of a Restatement (Third). Unlike the
Restatement (First), which was designed to create
certainty in law, the project of the Restatement
(Second) was to restore the autonomy of law from
politics by acknowledging but limiting (through
the rules of the Restatement) the discretion granted
judges. This alteration in the Restatement project,
however, did not affect the overarching view that
uniformity in law was both possible and desirable.
Law remained a science.
A final example of uniformity is the bar
examination. In 1870, a written bar examination
existed only in some counties in Massachusetts. By
1931, when the National Conference of Bar
Examiners (NCBE) was created, thirty-eight states
required passage of a written examination and ten
states required bar applicants to pass some
combination of written and oral examination. Part
of the reason for the NCBE's existence was to ensure
the "professionalism" of lawyers by making more
uniform bar examination requirements among the
states. The NCBE first wielded power by making
uniform the character investigation of a lawyer who
applied to another state for a license to practice
law. It also worked to make uniform other aspects
of licensure, like the type and form of the bar
examination. In 1972, the Multistate Bar Exami-
nation (MBE) was first introduced as part of a bar
examination. Today, the MBE is used by nearly
all jurisdictions as a substantial part of their
examination. The Multistate Professional Respon-
sibility Examination (MPRE), introduced in March
1980 and then required by six states, is now required
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by forty jurisdictions. Additionally, several states
have expressed an interest in adopting the Multistate
Essay Examination (MEE), introduced in 1988.
The interest in uniformity in bar examinations
has not led to a uniform—or even national—bar.
Instead, uniformity has led to the creation of bar
review organizations such as BAR/BRI and PMBR,
organizations which teach law school graduates
how to pass the various bar examinations. The
organizations' lectures are given almost exclusively
by law professors (and several bar review
organizations were in fact started by law professors).
This profitable business allows law schools to
continue to say they teach students the science of
law, gives law professors the opportunity to earn
extra income for teaching bar review courses and
allows the profession to insist to the public (without
any empirical evidence) that bar examinations test
competence, thus providing a method of quality
control.
Legal Publications
In 1870, the Albany Law Journal, a weekly
newspaper for lawyers, joined the monthly
American Law Register and the quarterly American
Law Review as commercial periodicals devoted to
the legal profession.'" The Albany Law Journal was
not intended as a local paper; it succeeded as a
national journal of the legal profession, thus
contributing to the perception of a unified legal
profession. The success of the Albany Law Journal
inspired others to start law-related journals,
including the Central Law Journal, based in St.
Louis, and a number of other law journals in
America's larger cities. These other journals, like
nascent state and local bar associations, encouraged
professionalism. One stated goal of these periodicals
was to improve the image of the legal profession;
it actually may have done so by informing lawyers
of the most recent decisions handed down by courts.
A year after the appearance of the Albany Law
Journal, the company that is now Lawyers
Cooperative/Bancroft-Whitney began publishing a
series of selected leading cases from the states with
annotations. These American Reports were a handy
guide to understanding the most "important" cases
recently decided. Five years later, two brothers
started reporting selected cases decided by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. As early as 1878, the
brothers were publishing all the cases in Minnesota
and five adjoining states in the Northwestern
Reporter.
The West Publishing Company expanded in
1887 to publish, in seven regional reporters, all of
the decisions of the highest court of each state in
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the country. It also published the decisions of the
federal courts. That same year, a group of
industrious students at the Harvard Law School,
buoyed by the 1886 commemoration of the 250th
anniversary of Harvard University and the founding
of the Harvard Law School Association, decided
to publish a review of law. These events were crucial
to creating a professional image for lawyers in
several respects. First, the publication of regional
reporters both democratized and professionalized
lawyers. Regional reporters and commercial law
journals democratized lawyers by giving them easier
access to a greater number of analogous cases; it
professionalized lawyers by permitting courts to
require lawyers to undertake a greater amount of
research when the case involved difficult or
unsettled legal issues. For example, by the time of
the publication of the First Decennial Digest in
1897, West Publishing Company (possibly in an
effort to market the Digest) claimed that there were
over half a million reported cases. Second, the
publication of all reported cases placed greater
pressure on appellate court judges to justify their
decisions, either on substantive (legal) grounds, or
on procedural (standards of review) grounds. The
development of law journals, especially student-run
law reviews, also affected the decisions of appellate
court judges, for these journals provided a forum
for a more searching criticism of recent decisions
by both authors of articles and student editors.
Third, the regional reporters provided an overflow
of data for lawyers to comprehend, which privileged
the organizational knowledge of professors whose
treatises and casebooks attempted to systematize the
data, and made more attractive the view that law
was a science consisting of relatively few principles.
One result of the effort to systematize the data, as
discussed above, was the founding of the American
Law Institute. Thus, the organizing and system-
atizing of the common law was left in the hands
of the legal academics.
The creation of the student-run law review also
contributed to the preeminence of professorial
commentary. Purportedly meritocratic, the law
reviews limited membership to students at the top
of their class. That is, only those students who
thought most like their professors would be
admitted to the law review. This meant that the
students operating the law review were of a similar
mind as their professors, which skewed the views
afforded publication. Second, the class of legal
professionals who enjoyed the most time to write
for these reviews were law professors, thus giving
the professor another forum for advancing his views.
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While the Albany Law Journal, the Central
Law Journal, the American Law Register and the
American Law Review and most other commercial
law journals ceased publication early in the
twentieth century, the law school-based law review
proliferated. While there existed only two law
school-based law reviews before 1900, nearly every
law school today has at least one (and often more
than one) review edited by law students. This
imitation of the Harvard model has encased a review
structured by Langdell's maxim, for the usual
output of a review consists of one or more articles
written by law professors and one or more comments
and casenotes critically reviewing an aspect of law
written by students.
Continuing Legal Education
Law schools claim to teach their students in
legal reasoning. To better teach students in the
science of law and legal reasoning, the nonprac-
ticing professor contributed to the profession by
writing a treatise or a casebook, the latter being
largely a compilation of "relevant" appellate cases.
In 1932, Jerome Frank, whose 1930 book Law and
the Modern Mind had challenged the objectivity
of judicial decision-making, suggested that the law
school, in part because of the casebook method of
studying appellate decisions, had become too
academic and Langdell's "false dogmas" needed to
be repudiated. Frank's plea for clinical programs
in law schools was largely ignored until the 1960s
and later. Instead of reforming or transforming legal
education, other institutions began supplementing
the education of students in law school. Larger law
firms were able to supplement the "scientific"
education of new lawyers by training their new
associates in programs designed by the firm for the
benefit of the firm. In the 1930s, however, most law
firms could not afford the costs associated with this
training program. In the depths of the Depression,
a New York City practitioner named Harold
Seligson found a niche offering a "practical"
education in law. Seligson offered Practising Law
Courses taught by four practitioners. By 1936, nine
courses were being taught by forty practitioners
covering 180 hours of instruction. Lawyers
interested in the program began by attending sixty
hours (thirty two-hour sessions) of general courses
and then "graduating" to specialized courses.
Seligson's "Practising Law Courses" were then
organized under the banner of the Practising Law
Institute (PLI).
Seligson informed the ABA about PLFs efforts
regarding continuing legal education in the late
1930s, and while the ABA resolved to sponsor such
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a program, no action was taken until after World
War II. In 1946, the ABA decided to sponsor a
national continuing legal education program. It
chose not to align itself with PLI but with the ALI,
and the ALI-ABA continuing legal education
programs began in 1948. The greater national
reputations of both the ALI and the ABA effectively
restricted the PLI to programs in New York for
the next twenty years.
The displacement of PLI by ALI-ABA was an
attempt to alter the goal of continuing legal
education from training the new lawyer in the
"practice" of law to making experienced lawyers
better "experts" in specialized fields of law. Four
reasons explain the change: First, the establishment-
oriented ALI and ABA, as strong supporters of the
three-year university-based, casebook-saturated law
school, were opposed to officially recognizing a
grievous fault in legal education, that is, the failure
to train lawyers how to practice law. The ABA,
after all, accredited many of these law schools,
thereby putting its reputation on the line, and the
ALI consisted largely of graduates of and professors
from "elite" law schools who fervently supported
the system structured by Langdell. Second, the
explosion in law created by the entrenchment of
the administrative state, as well as developments
occurring in "private" law, required a much greater
need for lawyers by those businesses subject to
federal regulation and changes in the common law.
Third, the PLI was created when the national bar
passage rate was less than fifty percent, and
economic hard times made it difficult for many of
those who had entered the profession to find jobs
(or to find work as self-employed sole practitioners).
In contrast, the national bar passage rate in 1948,
near the beginning of America's long economic
boom, was sixty percent, and the benefits from the
GI bill gave students an incentive to attend an ABA-
accredited law school rather than an unaccredited
law school. Fourth, the teaming of two widely
recognized legal organizations for the purpose of
sponsoring continuing legal education programs
would create a competitor so large and powerful
that it would dominate the market.
There are three other developments in the legal
profession which affected continuing legal
education: graduate legal education leading to the
Master of Laws (LL.M.) or other degrees, making
mandatory to continued licensure continuing legal
education (CLE) and the advent of legal
specialization.
By the 1930s, a number of schools had programs
allowing a person who had received a Bachelor of
Laws (LL.B., now a J.D.) degree to spend one year
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as a graduate student and receive a graduate law
degree. These programs were designed for two
purposes: training future law teachers and training
lawyers in a specific area of practice. To train future
law teachers by inviting them to spend a fourth
year in law school confirmed the belief that law
was understood best in the classroom and library,
as Langdell had suggested.
The interest in training lawyers in a specific
area of practice was the result of several factors.
First, the graduate degree eventually became a
shortcut for attorneys interested in becoming experts
in number of legal fields which burgeoned with
the creation of the administrative state. The degree
itself became "proof" of the attorney's expertise in
a given legal practice specialty and thus differen-
tiated the attorney in the legal marketplace. Second,
the majority of graduate programs opened in the
last twenty-five years offer an opportunity for law
schools to earn an enormous profit, since most of
the courses are taught by adjunct professors whose
pay is minimal, the student-teacher ratios remain
higher than other graduate education, and ABA-
accreditation standards for graduate education are
slight. Over twenty-five law schools (one out of every
seven ABA-accredited law schools) presently offer
a graduate degree specializing in taxation, which
can only be explained by the belief that tax lawyers
need a graduate law degree and the likelihood that
these programs are very profitable. Third, since law
schools are not permitted by ABA accrediting
regulations to offer "majors" in their basic
educational program, a school can differentiate
itself within the law school market by trumpeting
a graduate program which offers a practice
specialization. Since graduate level courses are
ordinarily open to all students, this marketing tool
may entice some entering students to enroll who
otherwise might matriculate elsewhere. George
Washington University, for example, offers
graduate degrees specializing in administrative law,
corporate law, criminal law, environmental law,
government contracts law, international and
comparative law, labor law, land use law, law and
poverty, patent law, tax law and urban law.
Mandatory continuing legal education was first
broached in 1971. After a study of several years, the
Minnesota Supreme Court instituted mandatory
continuing legal education beginning in 1975. Iowa
and Wisconsin created similar programs that same
year. While only nine states approved a mandatory
continuing legal education program in the 1970s,
today at least thirty-seven states have some program.
The reason given for mandatory continuing legal
education was the necessity of ensuring continued
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attorney competence as laws changed. Of course,
the connection between continuing legal education
and attorney competence was not empirically
verified; it was simply assumed.
It is likely that the rush to mandatory
continuing legal education was the result of a crisis
of confidence in the bar. The Watergate scandal,
which resulted in an ABA-required professional
responsibility course (or a commitment to teach
professional responsibility issues in doctrinal
courses) for all law students, as well as the MPRE,
encouraged the bar to create programs restoring the
public's confidence in the professionalism of
lawyers. Mandatory CLE informed the public that
lawyers were duty-bound to remain competent and
that the state would revoke their license if they failed
to meet these competency requirements.
The proliferation of mandatory CLE resulted
in the proliferation of organizations supplying
programs satisfying CLE requirements. For
example, the State Bar of Wisconsin lists over
seventy organizations which have been granted
general program approval. The best known of these
organizations is the National Institute for Trial
Advocacy (NITA), formed in 1970 to "conu-ibute
to the development of an adequately trained,
professionally responsible trial bar, sufficient to
serve the needs of justice in the United States.""
NITA programs draw practitioners from all over
the country, and it has now begun to sell casebooks
as well as practitioner manuals and guides. Like
bar review organizations, NITA and other similar
CLE organizations affect law schools in two ways:
First, CLE organizations perpetuate the dichotomy
between the science of law taught in law schools
and the practice of law taught by CLE organiza-
tions. Second, like bar review organizations, CLE
groups enhance the power of professors, who are
overrepresented as speakers and panelists in CLE.
A legal specialization program allows an
attorney to claim an expertise not just as a licensed
lawyer but as a lawyer certified by a board of legal
specialization as particularly expert in a defined area
of law. The first legal specialization program was
instituted in 1971, the same year discussions
concerning mandatory CLE began. Both California
and Texas developed standards in 1971, and today
thirteen states have adopted some legal specializa-
tion program. Before the end of the 1970s, the ABA
had approved a Model Plan for Specialization.
Under the Model Plan, a lawyer must (1)
substantially engage in practice in the area of
specialty and (2) complete at least ten CLE hours
a year in that field in the three years before applying
for certification as a specialist. Additionally, a peer
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review committee assesses the qualifications of each
applicant before certifying the applicant.
The legal profession analogized itself to the
medical profession, and a number of lawyers argued
that the sharply rising curve of knowledge in law,
as in medicine, necessitated public recognition of
the specialization of legal practice. This scientific
analogy allowed lawyers and the public to continue
to think of law as a science. The ideology of legal
specialization is the attempt to reclaim the scientific
"nature" of law. Its instrumental value is in
differentiating suppliers of legal services.
The method of specialization in law, unlike
the method in medicine, places only a slight burden
on the lawyer-applicant. The ABA's "substantial
practice" requirement, for example, means a mere
twenty-five percent of the lawyer's practice is
devoted to that area of practice. The ABA's
requirement that a specialist complete ten hours
per year of CLE courses is minimal, since most states
mandating CLE as a condition of continued
licensure require all lawyers, not just specialists,
to spend at least ten hours per year in continuing
legal education. Certification as a specialist under
the ABA Model Plan requires little of the lawyer
and promises another marketing tool allowing
lawyers to declaim their professionalism.
Conclusion
The transformation of the practice of law from
a "trade" into a "profession" was in large part
fortuitous. The utility of lawyers to the industrial
and financial economies made some lawyers
integral parts of American capitalism. This rise in
their prestige was consolidated in part by the
creation of organizations like the ABA which
fostered the belief in the professionalism of lawyers.
The members of the ABA and other elite
practitioners supported the emergence of a
"scientific" view of law and legal education, a view
which also supported the professionalization of law.
The embrace by prominent practitioners and elite
organizations of the science of legal education
increased the prestige and influence of law schools;
the profitability of law schools (which resulted in
a great increase in their number) and the decline,
for various reasons, of legal apprenticeships, made
legal education a more popular way of entering
the practice of law. The legal professoriate assumed
the responsibility of created coherence in law by
clarifying and unifying legal doctrines through
legal treatises and uniform acts. The rise of the
administrative state in the early to mid-twentieth
century also solidified the making of a legal
profession. The regulation of the economy by the
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government created a need for more lawyers,
particularly lawyers with knowledge in particular
legal fields. This expansion of law was channeled
by the Restatements and by the creation of
continuing legal education.
The study of selected legal institutions in this
essay provides only a glimpse of the relationship
between the vision of law as a science and the
development of the American legal profession. A
multiplicity of factors, many of them historically
contingent, operated to create the perception of
lawyers as professionals. The story told here, like
all stories, tells us only a little something.
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